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The Orwellian Military
Commissions Act of 2006
Michael C. Dorf*
Abstract
In three decisions in 2004 and 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States
rejected the sweeping claims by President Bush that his role as Commander in
Chief entitled him to detain persons indefinitely and, if he chose, to subject them to
war crimes trials before military commissions that did not have all of the procedural
protections of courts martial. The Court’s rulings, however, left open the possibility
that, notwithstanding the treaty obligations of the United States under the Geneva
Conventions, Congress could authorize the President to take the steps that he could
not take unilaterally. In the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Congress
did just that. However, despite its title, the MCA does far more than authorize
military commissions. Most significantly, it eliminates the statutory right of
aliens declared by the government to be ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ and detained
indefinitely on that basis, to seek a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court.
To be sure, the MCA provides some right of access to federal court for persons
convicted of war crimes by military commissions or found to be unlawful enemy
combatants by a military ‘combatant status review tribunal’ or equivalent body,
but even then, it severely curtails opportunities for judicial relief. In this and
other respects, the MCA purports to confer rights that, upon close inspection, prove
illusory. For example, it uses the language of the Geneva Conventions, even while
forbidding courts to look to international and foreign sources to construe that
language. The MCA is, more broadly, an exercise in misdirection. It is, in a word,
‘Orwellian’.
1. Prologue: The Hamdan Ruling
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,1 was a
nearly total rebuke of the Bush Administration’s assertion that the President
had the inherent wartime authority to establish irregular military
* Isidor & Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Thanks to Jose
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an essay published onWrit.FindLaw.com. [mcd30@columbia.edu]
1 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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commissions to try detainees for war crimes, unconstrained by international
law or full judicial oversight.2 The Court held, inter alia, that: (1) it had jurisdic-
tion to hear Hamdan’s case;3 (2) neither the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (‘AUMF’)4 passed by Congress in the immediate wake of the attacks
of 11 September 2001, nor the Detainee Treatment Act (‘DTA’) of 2005,5
authorized the President to establish military commissions to try detainees;6
(3) there existed no military necessity of the sort that would warrant the use of
military commissions without congressional authorization,7 in part because
(as four Justices concluded), Hamdan was charged with ‘conspiracy’, which is
not recognized as a war crime under international law;8 (4) trial by a military
commission that lacked the procedural safeguards of courts martial under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (‘UCMJ’)9 failed to satisfy the UCMJ’s
own requirement that such procedural departures be justified by the imprac-
ticability of using the same procedures10 and (5) the procedures for trial
by military commission ‘violate the Geneva Conventions’,11 which, contrary to
the administration’s assertions, provide substantial protection to irregular
forces under their common Article 3.12
Hamdan was also significant for at least two further reasons. First, although
the lead opinion by Justice Stevens did not purport to overrule any
prior precedents, it substantially narrowed the scope of three World War
II-era cases on which the Bush Administration had repeatedly relied as author-
ity for its approach to detainees captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
2 The government argued in Hamdan that xx 1005(e)(1) and 1005(h) of the Detainee Treatment
Act (‘DTA’) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109^148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. xx 2000dd ^ 2000dd-1 and other provisions of the US Code), deprived the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction to hear Hamdan’s pre-trial challenge to the military commissions.
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763 (2006). Thus, according to the government,
Hamdan could only challenge his trial by military commission after conviction, and even
then, under the statute upon which the government relied, Hamdan would not be permitted
to invoke the protections of international law. See DTA x 1005(e)(3)(D) (permitting post-
conviction challenges under the ‘Constitution and laws of the United States’ to the extent they
‘are applicable,’ but not authorizing challenges under international law).
3 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764^2769.
4 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L 107^40, 115 Stat. 224 (18 September 2001),
note following 50 U.S.C.A. x1541 (2000 edn, Supp. III).
5 ‘DTA’ of 2005, Pub L No. 109^148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C xx 2000dd ^ 2000dd-1 and other provisions of the US Code).
6 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775 (‘Neither of these congressional Acts . . . expands the President’s
authority to convene military commissions’).
7 See id., at 2785 (‘Any urgent need for imposition or execution of judgment is utterly belied
by the record’).
8 See id. (‘the Government has failed even to offer a ‘merely colorable’ case for inclusion
of conspiracy among those offenses cognizable by law-of-war military commission’)
(quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US 1, 36) (1942).
9 10 U.S.C. x 801 et seq. (2000 edn. and Supp. III).
10 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790^2793 (construing Article 36(b) of the UCMJ).
11 Id., at 2793.
12 See id., at 2795^2796.
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In Ex Parte Quirin,13 Johnson v. Eisentrager,14 and In ReYamashita,15 the Supreme
Court had in one way or another rejected a challenge to the outcome of a
military tribunal. Finding that each of these precedents had either been
superseded or was narrower than the administration claimed, the Hamdan
Court asserted the primacy of what it deemed ‘the seminal case of Ex parte
Milligan’.16 In Milligan, a Civil War case, the Court stated, in sweeping terms,
that where no military emergency prevents the civilian courts from operating,
military courts are unconstitutional.17
Second, the Court’s opinion in Hamdan carried the implication, made express
in a concurrence by Justice Kennedy, that harsh treatment of detainees by
US officials would also violate common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
As Justice Kennedy stated bluntly: ‘violations of Common Article 3 are consid-
ered ‘‘war crimes’’, punishable as federal offences, when committed by or
against US nationals and military personnel’.18 Suddenly, the Court had
the attention of an administration that had once decried various provisions of
the Geneva Conventions as ‘obsolete’and ‘quaint’.19
It should have come as no surprise that the President would not permit the
Court to have the last word. Indeed, the Justices practically invited the political
branches to respond to their Hamdan ruling. Speaking for four of the five
Justices comprising the Hamdan majority, Justice Breyer opined that
‘[n]othing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the
authority he believes necessary’.20 Return he did.
2. ‘Orwellian’ Defined
The result was the Military Commissions Act (‘MCA’) of 2006.21 In a heroic
effort to make lemonade from a lemon, Neal Katyal, who successfully repre-
sented Hamdan in the Supreme Court, recently wrote that the MCA ‘puts the
final nail in the coffin of the Administration’s pretensions of ‘‘inherent author-
ity’’. It reveals that arguments of executive necessity were overblown, and
that Congress stands ready and able to change laws and give the President
the tools he needs (and then some)’.22 True enough, but as Katyal also
13 317 US 1 (1942).
14 339 US 763 (1950).
15 327 US 1 (1946).
16 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (citing Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2 (1866)).
17 See Milligan, 71 US at 120^121 (‘The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men, at all times, and under all circumstances’.).
18 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2802 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 18 U.S.C. x 2441).
19 A.R. Gonzales, Memorandum for the President, 25 January 2002, available at: http://
www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf (visited 5 December 2006).
20 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
21 Pub. L. No. 109^366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
22 N.K. Katyal, ‘Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice’, 120
Harvard Law Review (2006) 65, at 70.
12 JICJ 5 (2007), 10^18
acknowledges, ‘the MCA was rushed through Congress with no deliberation,
and it suffers from myriad constitutional and other legal problems . . .’.23
Even Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, who voted for the MCA, character-
ized some of its provisions as ‘patently unconstitutional’.24
Given that the Supreme Court in Hamdan pre-cleared Congress to authorize
military commissions, how can the MCA be unconstitutional, much less
patently so? The answer is that the MCA does much more than simply author-
ize military commissions. Some of its provisions have nothing whatsoever to do
with military commissions.
The MCA is a veritable cornucopia of law school examination questions.
Under what circumstances, if any, does an alien not present in the territory of
the United States but held by US authorities have a constitutional right to file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a US court? If Congress chooses to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, can it do so impliedly?
Does a country violate its treaty obligations by enacting implementing legisla-
tion that expressly forbids its domestic courts from considering international
and foreign sources in construing the treaty? And so forth.
Important as these questions are, the balance of this essay focuses not
so much on the draconian effect of the MCA as on a pervasive theme of mis-
direction. In numerous ways, the Act seems to be one thing, yet upon close
inspection proves to be something quite different, even the exact opposite.
Thus, just as George Orwell’s fictional dystopia of Oceana proclaimed that
‘war is peace’, ‘freedom is slavery’, and ‘ignorance is strength’,25 so the MCA
proclaims adherence to international law and the availability of judicial
review for detainees, even as it dispenses with both. The balance of this essay
explores some of the especially Orwellian features of the MCA.
3. AWholly Optional ‘Right’ to Judicial Review
Hamdan was not the Supreme Court’s first intervention in the Bush
Administration’s treatment of detainees. Two years earlier, the Justices decided
a pair of cases that also rejected sweeping claims of Presidential authority.
In Rasul v. Bush,26 the Court held that the habeas corpus statute as then
written entitled aliens captured overseas and detained at the US Naval Base
in Guanta¤ namo Bay, Cuba, to file petitions in federal court to challenge
the lawfulness of their custody. The Supreme Court said nothing, however,
about the substantive merits of the claims pressed by the alien detainees.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,27 decided the same day as Rasul, the Justices affirmed
23 Id., at 104 n. 158.
24 Editorial, ‘Profiles in Cowardice’,Washington Post, 1 October 2006, at B6.
25 G. Orwell, 1984 (New American Library edn., 1949), at 7 (describing the three slogans on the
fac ade of the Ministry of Truth).
26 542 US 466 (2004).
27 542 US 507 (2004).
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the government’s authority to hold American citizens alleged to have fought
against the United States in military custody, but rejected the government’s
assertion that the President’s say-so was a sufficient basis for treating such
citizens as ‘unlawful enemy combatants’.
What would be a sufficient basis for detaining an American citizen as an
unlawful enemy combatant? The Hamdi plurality opinion relied upon a 1976
precedent that measures compliance with due process by balancing the individ-
ual interest against that of the government.28 At a minimum, the plurality
said, a person the government seeks to designate as an unlawful enemy com-
batant must ‘receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral deci-
sionmaker’.29 He is also entitled to assistance of counsel. At the same time, the
Court gave considerable leeway to the government to depart from procedures
associated with civilian courts in criminal cases. The government could place
the burden of disproving its evidence on the defendant, could introduce hear-
say, and could utilize military, as opposed to civilian, tribunals to make the
combatant status determination.
Collectively, however, Rasul and Hamdi left two key questions unanswered.
First, are the procedural safeguards outlined in Hamdi also constitutionally
required for aliens held as unlawful enemy combatants, or does some lesser
standard of due process apply? In other contexts, the Supreme Court has held
that even where aliens are entitled to due process, the meaning of that require-
ment may be different for citizens and aliens,30 and so it is possible that the
Court would uphold procedures for classifying aliens as unlawful enemy com-
batants even though those procedures would be impermissible under Hamdi for
citizens. Second, if Congress were to amend the habeas statute so as to deny
its application to persons held on Guanta¤ namo, would it thereby violate
the Constitution? The Bush Administration had argued in Rasul that the
Eisentrager case established that non-resident aliens held outside the United
States have no constitutional right to habeas, even if Congress has not sus-
pended the privilege of the writ. However, the Rasul Court suggested ç but
found it unnecessary to decide ç that some of the factors that had led the
Eisentrager Court to find no constitutional right to habeas in the circumstances
presented in that case, were absent in the case of Rasul and other Guanta¤ namo
Bay detainees.31
28 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976).
29 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 533 (2004).
30 See, e.g. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 US 67, 78 (1976) (opining, in the course of rejecting a resident
alien’s due process challenge to a five-year residency requirement for medicare eligibility, that
‘[t]he fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause
does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages
of citizenship’).
31 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 US 466, 476 (2004) (noting, inter alia, that the Rasul petitioners ‘are not
nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they deny that they have engaged
in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded access
to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing’).
14 JICJ 5 (2007), 10^18
The MCA puts both of these questions squarely at issue. In approving the
detention of aliens pursuant to the findings of ‘Combatant Status Review
Tribunals’ (‘CSRTs’), the MCA raises the question whether the procedures
that the government has adopted for use in those CSRTs satisfy the
Constitution. One district court held that they do not, in so far as CSRTs
afford the alien a ‘personal representative’ but not a lawyer, and make the
determination that an alien is an enemy combatant based on classified infor-
mation to which the detainee does not have access.32
The MCA also provides a potential test of the question left open by Rasul ç
the scope of Eisentrager’s constitutional holding. The MCA eliminates any stat-
utory right to habeas corpus for aliens determined by the government to
be enemy combatants, regardless of where they are detained.33 Absent a valid
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, that provision is surely
unconstitutional to the extent that it authorizes the government to, say, detain
a permanent resident alien residing in NewYork City, without ever permitting
the alien to file a habeas petition. Even construed for all that it’s worth,
Eisentrager does not give the government this sort of un-reviewable authority
on what is indisputably US soil.
To be sure, the MCA reaffirms (and extends to detainees everywhere) the
DTA’s statutory right to judicial review of the determination that one is in
fact an enemy combatant.34 In some circumstances, this statutory right could
be a constitutionally valid substitute for habeas. Certainly nothing compels
the government to attach the label ‘habeas corpus’ to the procedure by
which persons can challenge their allegedly unlawful detention, so long as
the procedure the government does afford has the essential characteristics of
habeas. But in at least two ways, the statutory right of review provided by the
DTA and MCA is an inadequate substitute for habaeas.
First, the MCA expressly strips the federal courts of any and all power to
entertain challenges to conditions of confinement.35 Thus, for example, the
federal courts must dismiss a lawsuit filed on behalf of a detainee claiming
that he has been tortured in violation of federal law, including the MCA itself.
Second, although the MCA and DTA do provide for some judicial review
of the decisions of CSRTs, nothing in either statute requires the government
to utilize a combatant status review tribunal or its equivalent. The MCA defines
an unlawful enemy combatant as someone to be determined to be thus by
32 See In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 468 (D.D.C. 2005).
33 See MCA x 7.
34 See MCA x 10.
35 Subject to exceptions not relevant on this point, MCA x 7(b) provides that
no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action
against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the
United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
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a CSRT or other competent tribunal or someone who simply meets the Act’s
definition of unlawful enemy combatant.36
To repeat, the MCA strips the federal courts of jurisdiction even as to resident
aliens in the United States, including permanent resident aliens. Thus, under
the MCA, the President could make his own determination that a permanent
resident alien is an unlawful enemy combatant, order that permanent resident
alien detained and tortured within the United States, and no court would
have jurisdiction to hear any complaint filed on that alien’s behalf challenging
the lawfulness of his custody and treatment.
Patently unconstitutional indeed, and yet, because the jurisdiction-stripping
provision is joined with a provision that also confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts, its import is easy to miss. Ignorance is strength.
4. A Special ‘American’ Version of International Law
The government had argued in Hamdan that the Geneva Conventions did not
confer judicially enforceable rights on individuals. The majority did not directly
address this claim, finding that the UCMJ’s recognition of military commissions
beyond courts martial incorporated the international law of war by reference,
thereby rendering common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions justiciable.37
The MCA reverses that result. It expressly provides:
No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas
corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current
or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United
States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States
or territories.38
In principle, there is nothing wrong with a nation treating its treaty obliga-
tions as non-self-executing, provided that the nation then enacts implementing
legislation to give the treaty whatever effect it must have in domestic law.
And on its face, the MCA does just that. Section 6 of the MCA and other
statutes use the terms of the Geneva Conventions to define offences under US
law. But within Section 6 lies another, most peculiar, provision. It states:
‘No foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of
decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions
enumerated in subsection (d) of such section 2441’.39
It is not difficult to imagine where this gem comes from. In a number of
high-profile cases involving hot-button issues, the Supreme Court has divided
over whether it is ever appropriate to rely on foreign or international sources
36 See MCA x 3 (providing for new 10 U.S.C. S 948a(1)).
37 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794.
38 MCA x 5(a).
39 MCA x 6(a)(2).
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in interpreting the US Constitution.40 Although I have elsewhere expressed
scepticism about the possibility, much less the desirability, of American courts
blinding themselves to foreign influences when interpreting US law,41 at least
I understand the argument of those who think such sources irrelevant to
construing the US Constitution. The document’s meaning, they say, was either
fixed at the time of its adoption, or, if it evolves, does so in accordance with
the values of the American people, rather than the values of foreign peoples,
whose values may be different from ours, and difficult for American courts to
discern.42
But even those who criticize the use of foreign and international law
as sources for interpreting the US Constitution readily acknowledge that such
sources are highly relevant to treaty interpretation. Here, for example, is Justice
Scalia’s thoroughly reasonable view of the matter:
We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty
provisions. Foreign constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the
contracting parties. Moreover, it is reasonable to impute to the parties an intent that their
respective courts strive to interpret the treaty consistently . . .. Finally, even if we disagree,
we surely owe the conclusions reached by appellate courts of other signatories the courtesy
of respectful consideration.43
For the congressional authors of the MCA, however, Justice Scalia was too
radical an internationalist.
Accordingly, despite its repeated invocations of the Geneva Conventions,
the MCA in fact authorizes the United States to breach those Conventions,
because it authorizes the opening of a gap between the US-sourced
only interpretation of the Conventions and the consensus view of the
40 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 572^573 (2003) (citing Sexual Offences Act, 1967, ch. 60, x1 (Eng.)
and Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981) in support of the conclusion that a
Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy is unconstitutional) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 US
551, 578 (relying on ‘the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty’ to confirm the Court’s decision that it violates the Eighth Amendment) with id.,
at 622^628 (dissent) (arguing that the majority only invokes foreign sources when they confirm
its own views and that such sources should be irrelevant in principle).
41 See M.C. Dorf, The Use of Foreign Law in American Constitutional Interpretation: A Revealing
Colloquy Between Justices Scalia and Breyer, Findlaw’s Writ, 19 January 2005, available at:
http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/20050119.html (visited 4 December 2006).
42 In addition to the legitimacy and honesty worries expressed by Justice Scalia in his Roper
dissent, one might also worry about the limited capacity of judges in one legal system
to understand the nuances of institutions, and thus judgments by courts in, other legal
systems. See R.J. Krotosznynski, Jr., ‘‘‘I’d Like to Teach the World to Sing (in Perfect Harmony)’’:
International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses ç Reflections on the Perils and the Promise
of International Judicial Dialogue’, 104 Michigan Law Review (2006) 1321, at 1358 (reviewing
R. Badinter and S. Breyer (eds), Judges In Contemporary Democracy: An International
Conversation, New York, New York University Press, 2004): ‘The participants in the dialogue
harbored many false assumptions and displayed an alarming lack of familiarity with
the composition, institutional powers, and institutional role of the various constitutional
courts’.
43 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 US 644, 660^661 (2004).
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international community.Yet as a later-in-time statute, the MCA clearly prevails
over the Geneva Conventions in domestic law. Thus, should US courts find
themselves bound by the MCA to interpret the Geneva Conventions more
narrowly than the international consensus authorizes, they will put the
United States in breach ç and there is nothing the courts can do about it.
As Orwell might have said, ‘violation is compliance’.44
5. Conclusion
Americans and others who followed the news coverage of the debate that led
up to the enactment of the MCA could be forgiven for believing that the Act
was a compromise between a White House that sought far-reaching powers,
and Senators who sought to restrain the executive. After all, prior to reaching
an agreement with the President, three prominent Republican Senators with
military service records ç Lindsey Graham, John McCain, and JohnWarner ç
had drawn a line in the sand, refusing to go along with a measure that would
have, in their view, watered down common Article 3’s protections against
inhumane treatment.45 No doubt many casual observers believed that because
these three courageous senators stood on moral principle, the law that
emerged reflected a careful balance between liberty and security.
Even the small sample of provisions of the MCA canvassed in this essay
reveals, however, that the MCAwas no moderate compromise. On nearly every
issue, the MCA gives the White House everything it sought. It immunizes
government officials for past war crimes; it cuts the United States off from its
obligations under the Geneva Conventions; and it all but eliminates access to
civilian courts for non-citizens ç including permanent residents whose
children are citizens ç that the government, in its potentially unreviewable
discretion, determines to be unlawful enemy combatants.
In its seeming moderation, its velvet glove encasing what turns out to be an
iron fist, the MCA is Orwellian. It uses reassuring-sounding words to mean
almost their exact opposite.
The MCA is Orwellian in another, more ominous sense. It is difficult to
imagine a greater denial of individual liberty than the prospect of indefinite
executive detention without recourse to the judiciary. The MCA does not, of
course, transform the United States into Orwell’s dystopic Oceana, for it pre-
serves habeas corpus for citizens. In this, as in most respects, the nation
remains a constitutional democracy. But the MCA moves the country one step
down the road to tyranny ç and not just a baby step.
44 See Orwell, supra note 25.
45 See C. Hulse et al., ‘How 3 G.O.P. Veterans Stalled Bush Detainee Bill’, New York Times,
17 September 2006, at A1.
18 JICJ 5 (2007), 10^18
